Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy by Steinbock, Bonnie
University at Albany, State University of New York
Scholars Archive
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship Philosophy
9-2004
Payment for Egg Donation and Surrogacy
Bonnie Steinbock
University at Albany, State University of New York, bsteinbock@albany.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarsarchive.library.albany.edu/
cas_philosophy_scholar
Part of the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Scholars Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholars Archive. For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@albany.edu.
Recommended Citation
THE MOUNT SINAI JOURNAL OF MEDICINE Vol. 71 No. 4
Payment for Egg Donation and
Surrogacy
BONNIE STEINBOCK, PH.D.
Abstract
This article examines the ethics of egg donation. It begins by looking at objections to noncommercial
gamete donation, and then takes up criticism of commercial egg donation.
After discussing arguments based on concern for offspring, inequality, commodification, exploita-
tion of donors, and threats to the family, I conclude that some payment to donors is ethically accept-
able. Donors should not be paid for their eggs, but rather they should be compensated for the burdens
of egg retrieval. Making the distinction between compensation for burdens and payment for a product
has the advantages of limiting payment, not distinguishing between donors on the basis of their traits,
and ensuring that donors are paid regardless of the number or quality of eggs retrieved.
Key Words: Egg donation, ethics, commodification, payment, coercion, exploitation, informed con-
sent, altruism, families.
BOTH PAYMENT FOR EGG DONATION and payment
for surrogacy raise ethical issues. I will address
only egg donation, for two reasons. First, more
has been written about surrogacy than about egg
donation. Second, and more important, the two
practices raise very different ethical issues. Sur-
rogacy, or contract pregnancy as some prefer to
call it, involves giving birth to a child and then
waiving one's rights to custody of that child. In
a few well-publicized cases, surrogates have
changed their minds and attempted to keep the
children. This has never, to my knowledge, oc-
curred with egg donation. This is because there
is a huge psychological and emotional differ-
ence between giving someone else your egg to
gestate and deliver a baby, and gestating and de-
livering a baby yourself and then giving that
baby to someone else. Indeed, in most cases, the
egg donor does not even know if a child resulted
from her donation. While a donor certainly
should think about how she will feel about the
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possibility that there will be a child, or children,
genetically linked to her out there in the world,
she does not have to contemplate surrendering a
child to whom she has given birth. Additionally,
a child born from a surrogate arrangement may
feel abandoned by the biological mother, just as
an adopted child often does. The feelings of re-
jection by such children are likely to be com-
pounded by the recognition that the birth moth-
ers conceived them and relinquished them for
money. It is implausible that a child conceived
through egg donation would feel the same way.
Finally, whatever may be wrong with commer-
cial egg donation, it cannot plausibly be charac-
terized as "baby selling."
A Terminological Point: "Donors" vs.
"Vendors"
Some view the term "commercial egg dona-
tion" as an oxymoron. Thomas Murray (1)
writes, "Despite the repeated reference to
'donors' of both ovum and sperm, paying indi-
viduals for their biological products makes
them vendors, not donors." He recommends
that the term "AID" (artificial insemination by
donor) should really be "AIV" (artificial insem-
ination by vendor). In response, some maintain
that paying gamete providers does not make
them vendors, because they are not being paid
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for a product, but are being compensated for
their time, inconvenience, and risk. I will have
more to say about this later. In the meantime, I
continue to use the term "donation" even when
referring to the commercial enterprise, not be-
cause I want to prejudge the question of
whether payment is for the product or compen-
sation, still less to prejudge the question of
moral acceptability, but simply because it is ac-
cepted usage.
Law and Morality
One important distinction is between the le-
gality and the morality of egg donation. While
legality and morality are not entirely separate,
and arguments for making something illegal are
often moral arguments, the two often raise dif-
ferent issues. In Germany, Norway, Sweden,
and Japan, the use of donor eggs is illegal (2).
It is unlikely that egg donation could be banned
in the United States, because such a ban would
probably violate the constitutional right to pri-
vacy (3). What about banning payments to egg
donors? In Canada, there is proposed legislation
to ban the "buying and selling of eggs, sperm
and embryos, including their exchange for
goods, services or other benefits...." The Minis-
ter of Health adds (4), "This prohibition will
come into force over a period of time to ease the
transition from the current commercial system
to an altruistic system." Legislation in the
United States banning payment to egg donors
might not withstand constitutional scrutiny. It
would depend on whether or not banning pay-
ment is viewed as an undue restriction on pro-
creative liberty. The point I am making is that
even if there are serious moral objections to
commercial egg donation, there could be con-
stitutional barriers to making it illegal.
When the topic is the morality of a contro-
versial practice, an important question is
whether it is morally permissible. However, this
is not the only question we can ask. Margaret
Little characterizes moral permissibility as "the
thinnest moral assessment." Writing about
abortion. Little (5) says, "... many of our deep-
est struggles with the morality of abortion con-
cern much more textured questions about its
placement on the scales of decency, respectful-
ness, and responsibility. It is one thing to decide
that an abortion was permissible, quite another
to decide that it was honorable; one thing to de-
cide that an abortion was impermissible, quite
another to decide that it was monstrous." So
even if paying egg donors is morally permissi-
ble, it does not follow that it is desirable,
praiseworthy, or decent.
The practice of commercial egg donation
has come under severe criticism, but before ex-
amining the ethics of paying donors, we need to
see if there is something intrinsically wrong
about donating one's gametes to others for the
purposes of reproduction, even in the absence
of any payment.
Noncommercial Gamete Donation
The Roman Catholic Church opposes ga-
mete (ovum or sperm) donation because of its
views on the unity of sexual intercourse and
procreation. Sexual intercourse without open-
ness to procreation is wrong, the Church claims
(hence its opposition to birth control), but
equally so is procreation without sexual inter-
course (hence its opposition to most forms of
assisted reproduction). Even the "simple case"
of in vitro fertilization (IVF), where the hus-
band and wife provide the gametes and the re-
sulting embryos are implanted in the wife's
uterus, is impermissible, according to Catholic
teaching. The wrong is compounded in gamete
donation, as the introduction of "a third party"
violates the unity of marriage. In addition, ac-
cording to the Rev. Albert Moraczewski, egg
donation is demeaning to women, "A donor
woman is not really being treated as a person,"
he said. "Whether she is paid or acts out of
kindness, her egg is being used, so she is not
fully treated as a person whose reproductive ca-
pacity should be expressed as a result of the
love of her husband" (6).
But why is egg donation demeaning? Pre-
sumably blood donation is not demeaning, and
does not fail to treat the donor as a person. What
is the difference? The answer, according to the
Vatican, is that egg donation involves a wrong-
ful use of reproductive capacity. But then to
characterize egg donation as demeaning is not to
give a reason why it is wrong; rather, egg dona-
tion is demeaning because it is wrong. To see
egg donation as demeaning, one must accept the
principle that reproductive capacity should be
exercised only through a sexual act in the con-
text of a loving marriage. And that principle is
justified by the supposedly indissolvable unity
of sex, love and procreation. There is nothing
inconsistent or incoherent in this view, but it is
unlikely to be persuasive to non-Catholics who
accept contraception or assisted reproduction.
A different objection to gamete, specifically
sperm, donation comes from Daniel Callahan.
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AID is "fundamentally wrong," according to
Callahan, because a sperm donor is a father,
who has all the duties of any other biological
father, including rearing responsibilities. Sperm
donation, according to Callahan, is as irrespon-
sible as abandoning a woman when she be-
comes pregnant. He writes (7):
The only difference between the male who
impregnates a woman in the course of sex-
ual liaison and then disappears, and the man
who is asked to disappear voluntarily after
providing sperm, is that the latter kind of ir-
responsibility is, so to speak, licensed and
legitimated. Indeed, it is treated as a kindly,
beneficent action. The effect on the child is
of course absolutely identical — an unknown,
absent father.
Certainly, it is true that the child born from
sperm donation does not know his or her ge-
netic father. But it is not true that these children
are fatherless, as is true of most children whose
fathers abandon their mothers. They do have fa-
thers— the men who are raising them. Why, one
may ask, is it irresponsible to enable an infertile
man, who wants very much to parent a child, to
become a father? Sperm donors, it may be said,
do not evade or abandon their obligations, as do
men who abandon women they have impreg-
nated, but rather transfer their rearing rights and
duties to others. These others may be men or
they may be single women or lesbian couples,
who are increasingly using sperm donation. Is it
wrong to donate sperm if the resulting child
will grow up in a fatherless home? Is this an
abandonment of one's responsibility as a fa-
ther? In my view, this depends on whether the
child can be expected to have a reasonably good
life. There is evidence that children in single-
parent households are at a disadvantage (since
it is usually more stressful to raise a child on
one's own), but growing up in a lesbian family
does not appear to have a negative impact on
quality of parenting or children's psychological
development (8). Many lesbian mothers attempt
to mitigate the disadvantages of not having a fa-
ther by making sure that there are other men in
their child's life.
David Benatar (9) acknowledges that "ga-
mete donation is not a unilateral abandonment of
responsibility," but rather a transference of re-
sponsibility. Nevertheless, Benatar thinks that
the responsibility of child rearing is one that
should not be transferred, that doing so shows a
lack of moral seriousness. Certainly, transferring
child-rearing responsibilities without much
thought is reprehensible; one thinks of Rousseau,
who took five illegitimate children he had with
his mistress to an orphanage. But is that what
gamete donors do? Sperm and ova are not, after
all, children. In my opinion, gamete donors do
not give others their children to raise. Rather,
they enable people who very much want to have
children of their own to do so by providing
them with genetic material. A woman who does
not have eggs can still experience gestation,
birth, and lactation, giving her a biological, if
not genetic, connection to her child. In addition,
if her husband's sperm is used, he will also have
a biological connection to the child.
The Need for Egg Donation
Egg donation began in the early 1980s; the
first pregnancy using this technique was re-
ported in Australia in 1983 (2). Ovum donation
is offered to women with three types of repro-
ductive problems. Women in the first group
lack functioning ovaries. Those in the second
group have no detectable ovarian failure, but
they do not achieve pregnancy through IVF.
These include women for whom ovarian re-
trieval is unsuccessful and those who cannot
undergo egg retrieval, usually because scarring
or endometriosis prevents access to the ovaries.
A third group of women use donated eggs for
genetic reasons.
When egg donation was first introduced, the
eggs came from either close friends or relatives,
in a practice known as "known donation," or
they came from women who were undergoing
IVF themselves. Because the number of eggs
retrieved exceeded the number of embryos that
could be safely implanted, women undergoing
IVF often had extra eggs, which they were often
willing to make available for donation. This
source greatly diminished when it became pos-
sible to freeze embryos (egg freezing is still ex-
perimental). Another source of eggs was from
patients undergoing tubal ligation (6). How-
ever, the demand for donors soon outstripped
these sources and programs began to recruit
women from the public at large through adver-
tising. Thus, commercial egg donation came
into being.
The main reason for the increasing demand
for egg donors is that, for some women, using
an egg donor significantly improves their
chances of becoming pregnant. "An infertile
woman using her own eggs for in vitro fertiliza-
tion has about a 15 to 20 percent chance of be-
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coming pregnant, less if her ovaries are scarred
by infection or endometriosis or are simply too
old to function effectively. With an egg donor,
her chances of bearing a child shoot up to 30 or
even 40 percent" (10). The older the woman,
the greater are her chances of becoming preg-
nant if she uses donor eggs. According to one
article (11), "a 44-year-old woman attempting
IVF with her own eggs at Pacific Fertility has a
3.5 percent chance of becoming pregnant. If
that same woman uses a donor egg from a
younger woman, her chances of giving birth are
50 percent." For some women, therefore, egg
donation provides the only realistic option for
having a child.
What Is Involved in Egg Donation?
The process is very time-consuming. First,
the prospective donor must be accepted into a
program; this may involve several visits. She
will undergo physical and gynecological exam-
inations, blood and urine tests, and a psycho-
logical examination, and participate in discus-
sions of the responsibilities involved in becom-
ing a donor. Because eggs cannot be frozen (or
"banked"), the actual donation cycle will not
occur unless the prospective donor is accepted,
is matched with a recipient, and has given her
consent.
The following is typical of the medical
process undergone by donors. First, the donor
may take a prescribed medication for one or
more weeks to temporarily stop her ovaries'
normal functioning. This makes it easier to con-
trol her response to fertility drugs which will be
used later in the cycle. She will be given an in-
jection by the physician or instructed in how to
inject the medication daily at home. The med-
ications may cause hot flashes, vaginal dryness,
fatigue, sleep problems, body aches, mood
swings, breast tenderness, headache and visual
disturbances.
Next, medications must be injected over a
period of about 10 days to stimulate her ovaries
to mature a number of eggs (typically 25 - 30)
for retrieval. Frequent early morning transvagi-
nal ultrasound examinations and blood tests
(about every 2 -3 days) are needed to monitor
the donor's response to the drugs, and adjust the
dose as needed. While using injectable fertility
drugs, the donor may experience mood swings,
breast tenderness, enlarged ovaries and bloat-
ing. Occasionally, these medications result in
ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, in which
the ovaries swell and fluid builds up in the ab-
dominal cavity. If the hyperstimulation is mild,
it will recede after the donor's next menstrual
period. If the hyperstimulation is moderate,
careful monitoring, bed rest, and pain medica-
tion may be necessary. Severe hyperstimulation
is infrequent, but may cause serious medical
complications, such as blood clots, kidney fail-
ure, fluid accumulation in the lungs, and shock.
This condition can be life-threatening. Severe
hyperstimulation occurs in about 1-10% of
IVF cycles. It may result in one or both of the
donor's ovaries having to be removed.
The mature eggs are removed from the
ovaries in a minor surgical procedure called
"transvaginal ovarian aspiration." It is usually
done in the physician's office. First, the donor
will be given painkillers or put under intra-
venous sedation. Then, the physician inserts a
needle through the vagina to aspirate the eggs
out of the follicles. According to one descrip-
tion, "The procedure takes 15 to 60 minutes
and, except for grogginess and some mild
pelvic discomfort, there should be no after-
effects (12)." Some may experience more than
mild pelvic discomfort: one egg donor de-
scribed it (on a website for donors) as "feeling
like somebody punched you in the stomach."
Many donors find the actual retrieval less un-
pleasant than the side effects from the drugs.
Why Do Women Want to Donate?
Given the rigors of egg donation, why
would a woman who was not undergoing IVF or
tubal ligation be willing to undergo egg dona-
tion for strangers? Some donors are curious
about their own bodies and fertility. They want
to know if their eggs are "good" (10). Some
have a personal reason for helping, such as hav-
ing friends or relatives who have struggled with
infertility or have undergone miscarriages. Oth-
ers are attracted by the idea of giving "the gift
of life," as the advertisements for egg donors
put it. One donor explained it as follows, on a
donor website: "I can't even describe how it felt
to know that in some small way I helped this
couple achieve a huge dream in their life." But
while most egg donors are motivated in part by
altruistic considerations, most women would
not be egg donors for strangers without finan-
cial compensation. Many say that egg donation
would be impossible if they were not compen-
sated for lost work time, transportation, daycare
costs, and the like. However, most donors think
that reimbursement for pecuniary expenses
alone is not enough. They think that it is only
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fair that they should receive reasonable com-
pensation for what they go through in order to
provide eggs: the inconvenience, burden, and
medical risk they have endured.
How Much Payment?
Compensation has been increasing rapidly
over the years. In the mid-1980s, egg donors
were paid only about $250 per cycle. Today, the
payment is usually between $1,500 and
$3,000 —depending on the location of the
clinic. In an effort to attract donors, some clin-
ics offer substantially more. In 1998, Brooklyn
IVF raised its donor compensation from $2,500
to $5,000 per cycle to keep pace with St. Barn-
abas Medical Center in nearby Livingston, New
Jersey. "It's obvious why we had to do it," says
Susan Lobel, Brooklyn IVF's assistant director.
"Most New York area IVF programs have fol-
lowed suit" (13).
Donors with particular attributes, such as
enrollment in an Ivy League college, high SAT
scores, physical attractiveness, or athletic or
musical ability have allegedly been offered far
larger sums. "The International Fertility Center
in Indianapolis, Indiana, for instance, places ads
in the Daily Princetonian offering Princeton
women as much as $35,000 per cycle. The Na-
tional Fertility Registry, which, like many egg
brokerages, features an online catalogue for
couples to browse in, advertises $35,000 to
$50,000 for Ivy League eggs" (13). In March
2000, an ad appeared in The Daily Californian
(the campus newspaper for the University of
California, Berkeley), which read, "Special Egg
Donor Needed," and listed the following criteria
for a "preferred donor": "height approximately
5'6", Caucasian, S.A.T. score around 1250 or
high A.C.T., college student or graduate under
30, no genetic medical issues." The compensa-
tion was listed as $80,000 "paid to you and/or
the charity of your choice." In addition, all re-
lated expenses would be paid. Extra compensa-
tion was available for someone especially gifted
in athletics, science/mathematics or music.
Perhaps the most well-known instance of
commercial egg donation is Ron Harris's web
site, www.ronsangels.com, which offered mod-
els as egg donors, "auctioning their ova via the
Internet to would-be parents willing to pay up
to $150,000 in hopes of having a beautiful
child" (14). A subsequent story suggested that
the "egg auction" might just be a publicity stunt
to attract people to an erotic web site, a claim
that a spokesman for Mr. Harris denied (15).
Some infertility experts maintain that the ads
offering large sums of money for special donors
are not genuine offers, but rather a "bait and
switch" tactic to recruit donors. Donors who re-
spond are told that the ad has been filled, but
that there are other recipients (offering substan-
tially less money) seeking donors. The Daily
Californian ad mentioned above specifically
stated, "This ad is being placed for a particular
client and is not soliciting eggs for a donor
bank." I recently e-mailed the International In-
fertility Center in Indianapolis, asking them if
the fee of $35,000 mentioned in the news report
was actually paid to anyone. They responded
that the "high-profile client" on whose behalf
they had advertised did not find an ovum donor
meeting the requirements, and so no ovum
donor was compensated $35,000 for a cycle. I
have not been able to discover if any "special
donors" have received the sums in the ads.
Most people would distinguish between rea-
sonable compensation and offering $30,000 or
more to special donors. What explains the neg-
ative reaction most people experience when
learning of these huge offers? Perhaps we think
that people who are so intent on getting supe-
rior eggs (or "designer genes") will be incom-
petent parents. Instead of anticipating having a
child to love, it seems that the couple is focus-
ing on the traits their child will have. They are
not satisfied with having a healthy child, which
is the reason for genetic screening of donors.
Nor is their aim simply to have children who re-
semble them, something that adoptive parents
also usually want. These are reasonable re-
quests, whereas seeking donors from Ivy
League schools, with high SATs and athletic
ability, indicates something else. The placers of
these ads want, and are willing to pay huge
sums to get, a "superior" child, and this seems
inconsistent with an ideal of unconditional
parental love and acceptance.
Moreover, anyone who thinks that it is pos-
sible to guarantee that a child will be brilliant,
athletic, musically talented, or even blond
haired and blue eyed, is likely to be disap-
pointed. According to several prominent geneti-
cists writing in The New Republic "despite what
your high school biology teacher told you,
Mendelian rules do not apply even to eye color
or hair color" (16). Even genetic diseases
widely considered to follow Mendelian rules,
like sickle-cell anemia, may be more or less se-
vere, due to the interaction with other genes in
the genome. Predicting or determining non-
disease-related traits like intelligence, athletic
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ability, or musical talent is even less likely, as
there are probably thousands of genes that play
a role. Finally, the interaction of genes and the
environment makes it very difficult to know in
advance what phenotypic traits an individual
will have. This is not to deny that traits like in-
telligence or athletic ability have a genetic com-
ponent, but only to say that they cannot be guar-
anteed by the choice of an egg donor (who,
after all, only provides half the genes). We may
well worry about the welfare of a child who
fails to live up to parental expectations, after
the parents have spent all that money.
The welfare of offspring is a legitimate con-
cern, despite philosophical worries over how to
conceptualize it (17). If commercial egg dona-
tion led to poor parenting or had adverse effects
on the parent-child relationship, that would be an
important moral objection. Yet such an objection
might not justify the conclusion that the buying
and selling of eggs is morally impermissible,
still less that it should be legally banned. For we
do not think that procreation is morally permissi-
ble only for ideal parents. Nevertheless, concern
about effects on parenting and the parent-child
relationship fall under the heading of "thick"
moral assessments, and may be legitimate.
On the other hand, it is possible that couples
who place the ads understand that they cannot
determine their children's traits and that they do
not have false expectations. Nevertheless, they
might say, they want to give their child an ad-
vantage, a better chance at traits likely to help
the child in life. It is not that they can only love
a tall, brilliant, athletic child, they might say,
but rather than they are well aware how advan-
tageous such traits can be. Why, they might ask,
if they have the money to spend, should they
not use it to give their child the best chance in
life? Indeed, some have argued that prospective
parents are morally required to have the best
child they can (18).
The Human Fertilization and Embryology
Authority (HFEA) in the U.K. cited "the physi-
cal and psychological well-being of children
born from egg donation" as a reason to ban all
payments, not just large ones, to egg donors.
According to one member of HFEA (19), "Chil-
dren produced by egg donation could be ad-
versely affected psychologically if they knew
that payment had been made as part of their cre-
ation." This seems not only speculative, but im-
plausible. Children may be psychologically
harmed if they sense that their parents' love is
contingent on their having certain traits, but
why would a child be psychologically harmed
by learning that the woman who provided the
egg from which he or she was conceived re-
ceived payment? It seems to me that this con-
cern stems from an inappropriate analogy with
commercial surrogacy. Children might well be
upset to learn that their biological mothers gave
them away for money, but it seems implausible
that any child would have similar feelings about
an egg donor. This being the case, it is hard to
see why children would be affected by whether
donors were paid or not.
Another moral objection to these ads is that
they are elitist and violate a principle of equality.
There is something offensive in the idea that the
eggs of Princeton women are worth $50,000,
while the eggs of women at Brooklyn College
are worth only $5,000. (John Arras has jokingly
suggested that perhaps US News & World Report
should include how much their coeds can get for
their eggs in their rankings of colleges [personal
communication].) Yet it is not clear why we
should be offended at the difference in the price
put on eggs if we are not offended by differences
in employment opportunities or salary.
Some people are disturbed not only by the
payment of large sums to egg donors, but by any
payment at all. Commercial egg donation is crit-
icized on the grounds that this "commodifies"
the human body or "commodifies" reproduction.
Commodiflcation
To commodify something is to give it a
market price. That in itself is not a bad thing.
We could not buy our groceries or clothes or the
morning paper if they did not have a market
price. If some things should not be commodi-
fied, we need a rationale for this. This is not al-
ways forthcoming. As the guest editors of a re-
cent special issue on commodification in the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal say (20),
"Unfortunately, a great deal of the talk about
'commodification' has been clumsy and sloppy.
The term has been used as a magic bullet, as if
saying, 'But that's commodification!' is the
same as having made an argument."
The challenge is to distinguish legitimate
activities in which the human body or its abili-
ties are used, from those thought to be illegiti-
mate. As Ruth Macklin has put it (21), "Every
service in our economy is sold: academics sell
their minds; athletes sell their bodies.... If a
pretty actress can sell her appearance and skill
for television, why should a fecund woman be
denied the ability to sell her eggs? Why is one
more demeaning than the other?"
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Those who tend to oppose commodification
typically portray those who are skeptical about
its moral wrongness as being enamored of the
market, of thinking that freedom of choice is
the only or the most important moral value.
They say, "...there are some categories of
human activities that should not be for sale
(22)." But this, even if true, is unhelpful. We
want to know what things and activities should
not be for sale and why! Michael Walzer gives
voting as an example of a market exchange that
should be blocked. Citizens may not sell their
votes or vote a certain way for a price (23). This
is so even if the exchange is fully voluntary and
even if it makes both parties better off. The rea-
son why votes may not be sold is that this con-
flicts with the rationale for having the institu-
tion of voting in the first place. Voting is in-
tended to express the will of the people in a
democracy. Democracy is subverted if votes
can be bought.
What we want, then, is a similarly persua-
sive rationale for the wrongness of selling
human body parts. Suzanne Holland attempts to
give one. She writes (24):
For many of us, our sense of the dignity of
humanity is fundamentally disturbed by the
suggestion that that which bears the marks
of personhood can somehow be equated
with property. We do not wish to have cer-
tain aspects of that which we associate with
our personhood sold off on the market for
whatever the market will bear.
Eggs should not be seen as property, according
to Holland, because the human body is "inalien-
able." But what does this mean? To call rights
"inalienable" is to say that they cannot be taken
away from us, though Joel Feinberg has argued
that we can waive them (25). If calling the
human body "inalienable" means that others can-
not use my body or body parts without my per-
mission, that is undeniable. But why does this
imply that I may not sell my gametes? If "in-
alienable" just means "may not be treated like
property," then Holland has not given a reason
why eggs are not property, but rather a tautology.
The fact that something is a human body
part does not make it obviously wrong to sell it.
In the novel Little Women, Jo sells her hair to
raise money for her father, who is serving as a
chaplain in the Union Army. Surely that was not
morally wrong of Jo, nor demeaning to her. In-
deed, her willingness to part with "her one
beauty" is an unselfish and noble gesture. If
selling one's hair is morally permissible, but
selling one's gametes is not, what is the moral
difference?
It might be thought that I am missing an ob-
vious point. Selling one's hair is not wrong be-
cause hair is unrelated to sex and reproduction.
Selling one's eggs is akin to selling one's body
in prostitution, and "we all know" that prostitu-
tion is wrong. Actually, prostitutes do not liter-
ally sell their bodies, since they do not relin-
quish control. It is more accurate to say that
they rent them out, or rather that they perform
sexual acts in exchange for money. Most of us
believe that this is wrong, but this belief may be
due in part to sexual puritanism. Perhaps the
distaste we feel for prostitution stems (at least
in part) from the way prostitutes have typically
been regarded in patriarchal societies — as
women of no value, undeserving of respect.
Imagine a world in which those who provided
sexual services were treated with as much re-
spect as psychotherapists, trainers, and
masseurs are in our society. It might be that,
under such conditions, prostitution would not
be as degrading. But even if this argument is in-
valid, there is a vast personal difference be-
tween these two types of "selling," and there is
no obvious reason why paying egg donors is in-
compatible with treating them with respect.
There are two more reasons why selling
eggs might be wrong. Providing eggs is both
painful and risky. Perhaps offering money to
women will lead them to take undue risks,
opening up the potential for coercion or ex-
ploitation. In addition, some argue that payment
for eggs inserts the values of the market into the
family. I will consider these objections in turn.
The Potential for Coercion or Exploitation
In its report on Assisted Reproductive Tech-
nologies, the New York State Task Force made
the following recommendation (2):
Gametes and embryos should not be bought
and sold, but gamete and embryo donors
should be offered compensation for the time
and inconvenience associated with donation.
Payments to egg donors should not be so
high as to become coercive or so low that
they provide inadequate reimbursement for
time and inconvenience.
Can offering large sums of money for eggs be
seen as coercive? That depends on the theory of
coercion that one adopts (26). In one theory, to
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coerce is to make a threat: do this or I will make
you worse off. The classic example is the high-
wayman who says, "Your money or your life."
Clearly, potential egg donors are not coerced in
this sense, no matter how much money is of-
fered to them. They can turn down the offer and
be no worse off than they were.
Perhaps this is too narrow a view of coer-
cion. Perhaps there can be "coercive offers" as
well as threats. Consider the following example:
The Lecherous Millionaire: Betty's child
will die without expensive surgery, which is not
covered by her insurance. Alan, a millionaire,
offers to pay for the surgery if Betty will have
sex with him.
Alan is not threatening Betty. He will not
harm her if she refuses. Yet there is a very real
sense in which she has "no choice," and for this
reason we might see the offer as coercive. But
even if this is true, and there can be "coercive
offers," does this apply to egg donation? It
might, if the money were offered to terribly
poor women whose lives, or the lives of their
children, depended on their donating eggs. A
woman whose only choice was to give away her
eggs or see her child die of starvation might
well be seen as the victim of coercion. How-
ever, poor women are not usually sought out as
egg donors. Typical egg donors are middle-
class, often professional, young women. It is
simply not true to say that they have no choice
but to sell their eggs.
Very large offers of money could be quite
tempting to any woman, not just those in des-
perate need of money. But, as Wertheimer
points out, offers are not coercive just because
they are tempting. And they are not coercive be-
cause they are so good that it would be irra-
tional to refuse. It is not coercive to offer some-
one a great job at double the salary she is cur-
rently earning (27).
However, if offers of large sums of money
are not coercive, they may still be criticized as
being "undue inducements." Offering "too
much" money may be an attempt to manipulate
women into becoming donors. The lure of fi-
nancial gain may lead them to discount the risks
to themselves and to make decisions they will
later regret. To take advantage of this is a form
of exploitation.
It might be argued that we should not at-
tempt to protect adults from irrational assess-
ments or choices they will later regret, because
this is paternalistic. However, paternalism in-
volves preventing people from doing what they
want on the grounds that this is in their best in-
terest. It is not paternalistic to refrain from tak-
ing advantage of someone's susceptibility to
temptation.
Some people have tried to meet the charge
of commodification by distinguishing between
compensating egg donors for their time, risk,
and inconvenience, and payment for their eggs.
This distinction has been challenged by several
commentators, including Ruth Macklin, who
writes (21), "If there is something suspect about
commodifying human reproductive products, it
is similarly suspect to commodify human repro-
ductive services." However, I think there are
two reasons to distinguish between payment for
time, risk, and inconvenience, and payment for
eggs. First, if payment is viewed as compensa-
tion for the burdens of egg retrieval, then large
payments based on the donor's college, height,
or SAT scores would be unjustified. It is as bur-
densome for a SUNY-Albany student as it is for
a Princeton student to go through the egg re-
trieval process. Additionally, if payment is
compensation for the donor's time, risk, and
burden, then donors would be compensated re-
gardless of the number or quality of eggs re-
trieved, whereas this makes no sense if payment
is for the product (eggs). Despite Macklin's re-
jection of the product/service distinction, she
makes precisely this recommendation.
If excessive payments exploit donors, so do
payments that are too low. Justice would seem
to require that the women who go through the
rigors of egg retrieval be fairly compensated.
Why are only egg donors expected to act altru-
istically, when everyone else involved in egg
donation receives payment? In light of the sacri-
fices of time, risk, and burden that egg donors
make, it seems only fair that they receive
enough money to make the sacrifice worthwhile.
Other Worries About Exploitation
Concerns about the exploitation of egg
donors are not limited to payment issues. When
the New York State Task Force on Life and the
Law completed its report on assisted reproduc-
tive technologies (2), one of its findings was
that there were serious omissions in the process
of gaining informed consent of egg donors.
Donors did not always know how strenuous do-
nation would be, or how much time it would
take. They often had only the vaguest idea
about who would pay their expenses, should
there be medical complications stemming from
donation. In one study, researchers were told by
a number of women that all of their follow-up
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care was provided free of charge, but two
women were billed for medical expenses for
follow-up care and medical complications even
though both were promised that the clinic
would cover these costs:
One woman was promised follow-up care
prior to donating, but after the donation, that
care was denied. She sought out her own
personal physician for a sonogram and had
to pay hundreds of dollars out of pocket be-
cause she was uninsured at the time. (28)
Another woman fainted at work while tak-
ing hormonal inject ions. She had muscle
spasms and started to convulse, and had to stay
overnight in the hospital. "The clinic denied
that her condition was related to the donation
and refused to pay for her hospitalization. She
is currently fighting with her own health insur-
ance and worker ' s compensat ion over the
$3500 bill" (28).
One of the most significant sources of con-
flict in egg donation is the pressure on health
care providers to hyperstimulate the donor to
produce the maximum number of oocytes. The
more eggs, the better the recipient 's chances at
implantation, but the greater the danger to the
donor of suffering from hyperstimulation syn-
drome (28). One donor who testified before the
advisory committee to the New York State Task
Force on Life and the Law revealed that one of
her cycles had been stopped, but she had no
idea that this was due to excessive stimulation,
which had posed health risks to her. She
thought that the reason so many eggs had been
retrieved was that she was "super-fertile." One
of the fertility doctors on the committee said
that it was not uncommon for clinics to "flatter"
donors in this way, to get them to be repeat
donors. Such deceptive treatment of donors is,
in my view, a greater source of exploitation,
and an area of greater moral concern, than of-
fering payment.
Altruistic egg donation would not necessar-
ily be immune from exploitation. In fact, the
true risks and burdens of egg donation might be
less likely to be revealed in a voluntary system
than in a carefully regulated commercial mar-
ket, if only because the counseling and screen-
ing of donors costs money. Yet altruism can be
an appropriate factor. When egg donation im-
poses little or no extra burden, as in the case of
women who are undergoing IVF themselves or
women having tubal ligations, there is less rea-
son to compensate women for donating. Altru-
ism in such cases is morally appropriate, as is
the case with blood donation, which also in-
volves minimal time and risk. The greater the
burdens and risks, the less appropriate is the ex-
pectation of altruistic donation.
For some critics, it is not concerns about
vulnerable donors that lie at the heart of their
objections to commercial egg donation, but
rather the effects on the families that are
created, and ultimately on society at large.
Threats to Families
Tom Murray writes (1):
New reproductive technologies are a chal-
lenge to our notions of family because they
expose what has been at the core of the fam-
ily to the vicissitudes of the market. At the
heart of our often vague concerns about the
impact of new reproductive technologies,
such as those about the purchase of human
eggs, is our sense that they threaten some-
how what is valuable about families.
While Murray acknowledges that even noncom-
mercial gamete donation raises "morally rele-
vant difficulties" (presumably those raised by
Callahan [7] and Benatar [9], as well as the
issue of the introduction of "a third party" into
the marital relationship), he thinks it likely that
these difficulties are outweighed by the good of
creating new parent-child relationships. It is
payment that Murray finds morally objection-
able. He writes (1):
If you believe that markets, the values mar-
kets exemplify, and the relationships that
typify market interactions, celebrate human
freedom, and that such freedom is the pre-
eminent good, then none of this should
bother you. If, however, you regard families
as a sphere distinct from the marketplace, a
sphere whose place in human flourishing re-
quires that it be kept free of destructive in-
cursions by the values of the market, paying
gamete providers should trouble you.
I think we would all agree that families
should be protected from destructive incursions
by the values of the market—but which incur-
sions are destructive? Presumably it is okay to
pay the people who care for our children: day
care workers, nannies, and babysitters. These
transactions, supposedly, do not commercialize
families. Also, presumably, there is nothing
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wrong with paying those who provide fertility
treatment: doctors, nurses, receptionists,
lawyers, and genetics counselors. So what is it
about paying gamete providers that is threaten-
ing to families? Murray does not say. One can
agree with his view (1) that "thinking of chil-
dren as property, and of family life as essen-
tially a series of commercial transactions, is a
grievous distortion," but it is unclear what this
has to do with paying gamete donors. Eggs are
not children, and buying eggs (or even em-
bryos) is not buying children. Still less is it
clear why reasonable compensation to egg
providers should turn family life into a series of
commercial transactions.
Incomplete Commodification:
A Reasonable Compromise
Is there room for compromise between
those who prefer an altruistic system of egg do-
nation and those who think that egg donors
should be paid? Suzanne Holland suggests we
take an approach she calls "incomplete com-
modification" (24):
With respect to gamete donors, an incom-
pletely commodified approach could recog-
nize that donors are contributing to some-
thing that can be seen as a social and per-
sonal good (remedying infertility), even as
they deserve a degree of compensation that
constitutes neither a financial burden ([if
they are paid] too little) nor a [temptation to
undergo] health risk ([if paid] too much), I
see no reason not to follow the suggestion of
[the] ASRM [American Society for Repro-
ductive Medicine] and cap egg donor com-
pensation at $5000.... Allowing some com-
pensation, but capping it at $5000, would re-
duce the competition for eggs and perhaps
curb the lure of advertising that is targeted
to college students in need of "easy money."
Not everyone agrees that $5,000 is appro-
priate compensation. Mark V. Sauer, a repro-
ductive endocrinologist at Columbia-Presbyter-
ian Medical Center, was "shocked" by the deci-
sion of St. Barnabas to double compensation
from the community standard of $2,500 to
$5,000 per cycle: "Even if one considers the
time spent in traveling to the local office and
waiting for an ultrasound exam to be 'work,'
donors now will be earning in excess of $300
per hour. I find it hard to believe that anyone
thinks this 'reasonable compensation' accord-
ing to the recommendations of the Ethics Com-
mittee of the American Society for Reproduc-
tive Medicine" (29). However, Sauer's figure
apparently takes into consideration only the
number of hours spent traveling to and waiting
at the clinic, together with the time required for
the procedure. It does not consider compensa-
tion for risk or discomfort, or the time that
some donors will have to take off from work or
classes due to side effects from the drugs they
must take. When these factors are considered,
reimbursement of $5,000 may not be an "inde-
cent proposal." Perhaps if, like Sauer, doctors
are worried that (29) "most importantly, and
most unfortunately, these expenses will have to
be passed on directly to our patients, who are
already spending considerable sums of money
to seek this procedure," they might consider re-
ducing their fees.
If compensation were completely banned,
few women would agree to be egg donors. Very
little egg donation would occur, and this would
be unfortunate for those women who cannot
have babies any other way. This is part of the
justification for paying egg donors; the other
part has to do with treating donors fairly. At the
same time, legitimate concerns about the psy-
chological welfare of the offspring created, and
the potential for exploitation of donors, speaks
to the need to limit payments to amounts that
are reasonable and fair.
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